What should DiEM25’s post-Brexit position be? (Part 2) - Vota nga anëtarët e DiEM25
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What should DiEM25’s post-Brexit position be? (Part 2)
A
64.15%B
35.85%The results of our first vote have just come in.
Of the four options under consideration, which you can review here, Option A topped the poll with 32.07%, Option B came second with 27.74%, Option D was third with 23.54% and, finally, Option C received 16.65%.
As a result, Options A&B will now be put to another round of voting to decide which will become DiEM25’s Brexit Process policy.
Both options favour an interim agreement between London and Brussels whereby two years after Article 50 is triggered, a Norway-style arrangement goes into force lasting at least for the term of the next British Parliament. This way on the one hand the Brexit verdict of the people of Britain is respected while, on the other hand, a period of stability is secured during which the next Parliament, one that is elected with a mandate to do so can settle Britain’s post-Brexit arrangements with the EU.
Where the two options (Option A and Option B) differ in on whether or not a commitment by PM Theresa May and her government to seeking such an interim Norway-style agreement with the EU should be a condition for DiEM25 supporting the triggering of Article 50.
Option A, which insists on this conditionality, has the merit that it does not give our consent to the Tory government for pursuing the end of free movement and other important rights the moment Article 50 is triggered.
Option B, which supports the triggering of Article 50 unconditionally, has the merit of avoiding the question: If Article 50’s activation is defeated in Parliament because PM May is refusing to commit to a Norway-style interim agreement, does this not mean that the UK stays in the EU against the will of voters?
Please consider this and cast your vote.
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OPTION A
Activation of Article 50, conditional on an interim EEA-type agreement
We support the immediate triggering of Article 50 (with or without Parliamentary approval), so long asthe UK government commits to propose to Brussels (at the time Article 50 is triggered) an interim EEA (Norway/Swiss-like) UK-EU arrangement to come into force two years after Article 50’s activation.
If the above condition is not met, we oppose the activation of Article 50.
Long-term agreement
Using the ‘space’ created by the Interim EEA-type Agreement (see above), we support negotiations between the UK and the EU leading to a long term agreement regarding the UK-EU relationship, to be approved by the British Parliament elected after Article 50’s activation.
OPTION B
Unconditional activation of Article 50
We support the immediate triggering of Article 50 (with or without Parliamentary approval).
Interim and long-term agreement
We support negotiations between the UK and the EU leading to an interim EEA (Norway/Swiss-like) UK-EU arrangement (to come into force two years after Article 50’s activation) and, subsequently, to a long-term agreement viz. the UK-EU relationship to be approved by the Parliament elected after Article 50’s activation.